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KANTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ECCLESIOLOGY 
Philip L. Quinn 
This paper begins with an outline of some of the main themes in the ecclesiol-
ogy Kant presents in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. It then discuss-
es implications of Kant's ecclesiology for issues concerning scriptural inter-
pretation and religious toleration. With the help of these implications, an 
objection to Kant's ccclesiology is developed, and a Kantian ecclesiology 
modified in response to the objection is sketched out. The Roman Catholic 
ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council is compared to both Kant's eccle-
siology and the modified Kantian ecclesiology. It is argued that on some 
points the ecclesiology of Vatican II represents movement in the direction of 
Kant's ecclesio]ogy while on others tension between Kant and Vatican II can 
be reduced by the modified Kantian ecclesiology. 
Much recent work in philosophy of religion by Christian philosophers 
has been done, so to speak, under a banner on which is emblazoned the 
motto 'Faith Seeking Understanding.' That motto adorns the cover of this 
journal. Such philosophy typically operates within a theological circle; it is 
philosophical theology with philosophy firmly fixed in the adjectival posi-
tion. It has produced noteworthy explications and defenses of such dis-
tinctively Christian doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation and the 
Atonement.' It also stands in sharp contrast to the philosophy of religion 
more customary in modernity since Hume, which views theological circles 
from the outside. They are dimensions of human culture that form the 
subject matter of religious studies, but philosophy, like the other disci-
plines that constitute religious studies, approaches them with secular 
methods and assumptions. From this perspective, many distinctively 
Christian doctrines are highly problematic; being revealed mysteries of 
faith, they resist philosophical examination and on that account suffer from 
neglect or perhaps misunderstanding by philosophers. 
Yet recent Christian philosophical theology has not been comprehensive 
in its engagement with theology. It is striking that it does not contain a 
richly textured discussion of philosophical ecclesiology, a doctrine of the 
church or churches. I think this is an unfortunate lacuna, and my hope is 
that this paper will serve as a stimulus to a discussion that begins to fill the 
gap. In order to be provocative, I focus on the ecclesiology Kant sets forth 
in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone and The Conflict of the Faculties. 
Some Christians will probably find my choice of a starting point odd if not 
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offensive. As John Hare observes, "especially in America, Christians who 
know about Kant tend to think of him as the major philosophical source of 
the rot which has led to the decline of Christianity in the West in the last 
two hundred years. He is seen as having taken a decisive step, perhaps the 
decisive step, away from the traditional faith."2 I disagree with this view. 
Like Hare, I take seriously what he calls the Christian seriousness of Kant. 
I plan to argue that Kant's ecclesiology contains a lesson that contemporary 
Christian philosophical theologians would do well to learn. 
The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I give a rough sketch 
of some of the main themes in Kant's ecclesiology. The second lays out 
Kant's solutions to two important problems; they concern scriptural inter-
pretation and religious toleration. In the third, r consider a major objection 
to Kant's views and suggest a modified Kantian ecclesiology that tries to 
accommodate the aspect of it that I find persuasive. The fourth and final 
section compares the Roman Catholic ecclesiology of the Second Vatican 
Council with both Kant's ecclesiology and my modified Kantian ecclesiolo-
gy. It argues that on some points the ecclesiology of Vatican II represents 
substantial movement in the direction of Kant's ecclesiology while on other 
points tension between Kant and Vatican II can be reduced by my modi-
fied Kanhan ecclesiology. 
1. Kant's Ecclesiology 
In response to doubts about the work's intention, Kant begins the pref-
ace to the second edition of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone with an 
explanation of what he hopes to accomplish in the book. Since a faith that 
purports to contain historical revelation can include the pure religion of 
reason while the latter cannot include what is historical in the former, he 
tells us, we should make the experiment of regarding the two as related 
like a pair of concentric circles. The pure religion of reason will be con-
tained within the inner circle, and the philosopher, as a teacher of pure rea-
son according to a priori principles alone, will be restricted to the inner cir-
cle. If this experiment succeeds, Kant wants us to conduct another. It is to 
examine alleged revelation, which is to be found in the part of the outer cir-
cle not contained in the inner circle, in the light of moral concepts in order 
to "see whether it does not lead back to the very same pure rational system 
of religion. II 1 If it does, Kant thinks, "we shall be able to say that reason can 
be found to be not only compatible with Scripture but also at one with it, so 
that he who follows one (under guidance of moral concepts) will not fail to 
conform to the other" (p. 11). For Kant, much is at stake in the second 
experiment because he thinks all of us are committed to the pure religion 
of reason by virtue of our possession of reason. So if the second experi-
ment succeeds, those of us who are also committed to revelation cannot be 
shown to have inconsistent commitments provided we interpret revelation 
in the light of moral concepts. If this is not the case, Kant sees only two 
possibilities for those who are committed to revelation. Either they will 
have two religions within them, and the two will be inconsistent. Or they 
will have within them the pure religion of reason and a conflicting cult of 
ceremonial worship. However this combination is bound to be unstable 
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because a cult has value only as a means. As Kant puts it, if the religion of 
reason and a ceremonial cult conflict, then, though shaking them up 
together might temporarily unite them, "directly, like oil and water, they 
must needs separate from one another, and the purely moral (the religion 
of reason) be allowed to float on top" (p. 12). Clearly Kant's project then is 
to use the pure religion of reason, if it is possible to do so, as a critical con-
trol on faith that relies on purported historical revelation. 
How does the project provide a way into a discussion of ecclesiology? 
In Book One of the Religion, Kant argues that we all suffer from a propensi-
ty to evil which is itself evil because we have brought it upon ourselves 
and are thus accountable for it. In Book Two, he goes on to contend that 
each of us can, because he or she ought to do so, carry out a moral revolu-
tion, aided by extrahuman assistance we cannot understand if it is needed, 
that dethrones, though it cannot eradicate, the evil propensity, depriving it 
of sovereignty over us.4 But even if each of us overthrows the sovereignty 
of this evil principle, all of us remain at risk and in danger that its sover-
eignty will be reestablished because we have not yet removed ourselves 
from an ethical state of nature, as it were, in which we are apt to corrupt 
one another. According to Kant, in such a state "despite the good will of 
each individual, yet because they lack a principle which unites them, they 
recede, through their dissensions, from the common goal of goodness and, 
just as though they were instruments of evil, expose one another to the risk 
of falling once again under the sovereignty of the evil principle" (p. 88). 
Our response to this risk ought to be to bestir ourselves to leave the ethical 
state of nature in order to become members of an ethical commonwealth. 
Kant thinks we have a duty to do so.' 
An ethical commonwealth is to be distinguished from a political state. 
In a political state, we stand under coercive laws that regulate outer behav-
ior while, in an ethical commonwealth, only non-coercive laws concerning 
inner morality, laws of virtue alone, unite us. Moreover, unlike moral 
laws, which concern what we are certain lies within our power, the idea of 
an ethical commonwealth involves "working toward a whole regarding 
which we do not know whether, as such, it lies in our power or not" (p. 
89). Hence the duty to endeavor to become members of such a social 
union is, according to Kant, a sui generis duty of the human race toward 
itself. Since public human laws can only regulate outer behavior, we can-
not think of ourselves as the legislators of an ethical commonwealth. Nor 
can we suppose that its laws are statutes enacted merely by the will of a 
superior being, divine positive laws, for in that case they would not be 
moral laws and the duty to comply with them would not be the free duty 
of virtue. Kant concludes that "only he can be thought of as highest law-
giver of an ethical commonwealth with respect to whom all true duties, 
hence also the ethical, must be represented as at the same time his com-
mands; he must therefore also be 'one who knows the heart,' in order to 
see into the innermost parts of the disposition of each individual and, as is 
necessary in every commonwealth, to bring it about that each receives 
whatever his actions are worth" (pp. 90-91). But the concept of such a 
highest legislator just is the concept of God as moral ruler of the world. 
And so an ethical commonwealth must be thought of as "a people under 
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divine commands, i.e., as a people of God, and indeed under laws of virtue" 
(p. 91). Of course, for Kant, a people of God is not a state with a theocratic 
constitution in which humans are subject to divine statutory laws; the 
divine legislation of a people of God is reason's moral self-legislation trans-
formed into a public principle of social union. Thus the idea of an ethical 
commonwealth as a people of God under laws of virtue possesses objective 
reality in human reason itself, and it fits comfortably within Kant's inner 
circle, where it contributes, as we shall see, to his account of the pure reli-
gion of reason. 
Kant considers this idea a sublime ideal, but he is not optimistic about 
our prospects for realizing it on earth under our own steam. He tells us 
that it is never wholly attainable and dwindles markedly under human 
hands; he thinks something about sensuous human nature circumscribes 
the means at our disposal for embodying it in any human institution. 
Given the stuff we are made of and the evil propensity we have brought 
upon ourselves, how, he asks rhetorically, "can one expect something per-
fectly straight to be framed out of such crooked wood" (p. 92)?6 He there-
fore suggests that founding a moral people of God is really a task only God 
can consummate, but he also insists that we must proceed as if everything 
depends upon us. What shall we do now to prepare ourselves for the 
divine completion of our endeavors? Kant's answer to this question is his 
ecclesiology. 
For Kant, an ethical commonwealth under divine moral legislation is a 
church. Considered merely as an ideal, such an ethical commonwealth 
may be thought of as the church invisible. An actual social union of 
humans that harmonizes with this ideal is a visible church, and "the true 
(visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral) kingdom of God on earth 
so far as it can be brought to pass by men" (p. 92). The political constitu-
tion of the true visible church will be neither that of a monarchy, ruled by a 
pope or patriarch, nor that of an aristocracy, ruled by bishops and other 
prelates. It will not be a democracy in which each member is governed by 
special inspiration or private illumination. Kant thinks its constitution is 
best grasped in terms of a domestic analogy familiar from Christian piety. 
The true visible church will be like "a household (family) under a common, 
though invisible, moral Father, whose holy Son, knowing His will and yet 
standing in blood relation with all members of the household, takes His 
place in making His will better known to them" (p. 93). So our endeavors 
are to be directed to doing what we can to bring about the existence of the 
true visible church and our membership in it. 
One might consider it an easy task to bring about the existence of the 
true visible church. Since its divine legislation is also reason's self-legisla-
tion, reason itself tells us what its laws must be. Hence it may seem that 
pure religious faith, which consists of belief in God together with our belief 
in morality's laws, suffices to enable us to bring the true visible church into 
existence. Kant rejects this optimistic view. He insists that "by reason of a 
peculiar weakness of human nature, pure faith can never be relied on as 
much as it deserves, that is, a church cannot be established on it alone" (p. 
94). As a Inatter of empirical fact, churches always originate in historical or 
revealed faiths. But such faiths contain not only moral laws that are uni-
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versally binding but also specifications of the organizational norms of con-
crete social unions or congregations. Kant thinks the question of how a 
church ought to be organized under particular conditions of experience 
"appears to be unanswerable by reason alone and to require statutory leg-
islation of which we become cognizant only through revelation, i. e., an his-
torical faith which, in contradistinction to pure religious faith, we can call 
ecclesiastical faith" (p. 96). We have no way of knowing whether or not 
such organizational statutes are divine statutory law. On the one hand, it 
would be presumptuous to assume that they are, because doing so might 
lead us to neglect the task of trying to improve the church's form. On the 
other, it would be equally presumptuous to deny that they are if they are 
completely harmonious with morality and, in addition, we cannot account 
for them in terms of normal processes of cultural development. Because of 
a weakness in human nature, Kant concludes, "in men's striving toward an 
ethical commonwealth, ecclesiastical faith thus naturally precedes pure 
religious faith; temples (buildings consecrated to the public worship of God) 
were before churches (meeting-places for the instruction and quickening of 
moral dispositions), priests (consecrated stewards of pious rites) before 
divines (teachers of the purely moral religion)" (p. 97). 
Yet, morally speaking, the temporal order of precedence is the reverse of 
the correct order; pure religious faith morally precedes ecclesiastical faiths. 
Statutory ecclesiastical faith should be only a vehicle for pure religious 
faith, and observance of the statutes specified by ecclesiastical faith is only 
a means to reaching the goal of living as a member of an ethical common-
wealth. Nevertheless, Kant supposes the vehicle is important. Its purpose 
is to preserve pure religious faith and insure its propagation in the same 
form to various times and places. According to Kant, ecclesiastical faiths 
founded on scriptures are better suited to serving this purpose than those 
merely grounded in tradition. History shows, he tells us, that "it has never 
been possible to destroy a faith grounded in scripture, even with the most 
devastating revolutions in the state, whereas the faith established upon tra-
dition and ancient public observances has promptly met its downfall when 
the state was overthrown" (p. 98). Even if one doubts these sweeping his-
torical generalizations, one can easily see the plausibility of the suggestion 
that scriptural faiths are, other things being equal, better able to preserve 
and propagate themselves than those that rest entirely on custom and oral 
tradition. 
For Kant, there is only one pure religion of reason, which consists of 
belief in morality and morality's God. The pure religion of reason can, 
however, be consistently embedded in more than one ecclesiastical faith, 
and so many ecclesiastical faiths, all of which are its vehicles, are only to be 
expected. In terms of Kant's analogy with the pair of concentric circles, the 
inner circle can be consistently contained in a variety of outer circles. Kant 
seems willing to allow that several ecclesiastical faiths actually do, or could 
come to, serve as vehicles for the religion of pure reason. He says: "There 
is only one (true) religion; but there can be fi7iths of several kinds. We can 
say further that even in the various churches, severed from one another by 
reason of the diversity of their modes of belief, one and the same true reli-
gion can yet be found" (p. 98). None of these churches is, as it stands, iden-
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tical with the true visible church, for all of them lack the universality Kant 
regards as a mark of the true visible church. All of them, being based on 
ecclesiastical faiths, contain elements of historical or revealed faith that can-
not command, as the pure religion of reason can, universal assent, because, 
Kant contends, "an historical faith, grounded solely in facts, can extend its 
influence no further than tidings of it can reach, subject to circumstances of 
time and place and dependent upon the capacity [of men] to judge the 
credibility of such tidings" Cp. 94). Yet each such church contains within 
the shell of its ecclesiastical faith, so to speak, a kernel that is the pure reli-
gion of reason. Each has within it the potential to grow closer to the true 
visible church. 
According to Kant, it is incumbent on us, in striving toward an ethical 
commonwealth, to liberate the kernel from the shell to the extent that it is 
humanly possible for us to do so. How far can we hope to get in this pro-
ject? On this question, Kant appears to be of two minds. In one passage, 
he expresses an optimistic moral eschatology. He predicts that "in the end 
religion will·gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds 
and from all statutes which rest on history and which through the agency 
of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirements of the 
good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, 'so that 
God may be all in all'" Cp. 112, my emphasis). But shortly thereafter he 
cautions us that this divine ethical state on earth "is still infinitely removed 
from us" Cp. 113). And in a less optimistic projection, though he insists that 
"we ought even now to labor industriously, by way of continuously setting 
free the pure religion from its present shell, which as yet cannot be 
spared," he immediately goes on to say of ecclesiastical faith "not that it is 
to cease (for as a vehicle it may perhaps always be useful and necessary) 
but that it be able to cease; whereby is indicated merely the inner stability 
of the pure moral faith" Cp. 126). So Kant, in one frame of mind, predicts 
that the pure religion of reason will eventually become freestanding and 
the true visible church will be realized on earth. In another, however, he 
more guardedly claims that, though it could be freestanding, the pure reli-
gion of reason may never actually succeed in becoming free of the shell of 
ecclesiastical faith. Yet, in either case, we ought even now to do what we 
can, in striving toward an ethical commonwealth, to liberate the pure reli-
gion of reason from the shell of ecclesiastical faith and to realize the true 
visible church on earth. 
A famous paragraph in which Kant lays out a taxonomy can be put to 
work in summing up his ecclesiology. It goes as follows: 
Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as 
divine commands. That religion in which I must know in advance 
that something is a divine command in order to recognize it as my 
duty, is the revealed religion (or the one standing in need of a revela-
tion); in contrast, that religion in which I must first know that some-
thing is my duty before I can accept it as a divine injunction is the nat-
ural religion. He who interprets the natural religion alone as morally 
necessary, i. e., as duty can be called the rationalist (in matters of 
belief); if he denies the reality of all supernatural divine revelation he 
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is called a naturalist; if he recognizes revelation, but asserts that to 
know and accept it as real is not a necessary requisite to religion, he 
could be named a pure rationalist; but if he holds that belief in it is nec-
essary to universal religion, he could be named the pure supernatural-
ist in matters of faith (pp. 142-143). 
Where does Kant himself fit into this set of categories? The question bris-
tles with difficulties. 
Kant tells us that his distinction between natural and revealed religion is 
meant to classify religion with reference to its first origin and inner possi-
bility. In these terms, the pure religion of reason is the natural religion, and 
various ecclesiastical faiths are forms of the revealed religion. Kant himself 
is a rationalist of some kind; he thinks our moral duties are exhausted by 
those prescribed by the pure religion of reason. He is not a naturalist, for 
he does not deny the reality of supernatural revelation. A rationalist, he 
tells us, "will never contest either the inner possibility of revelation in gen-
eral or the necessity of a revelation as a divine means for the introduction 
of true religion; for these matters no man can determine through reason" 
(p. 143). Kant contests neither of them. Nor is he a pure supernaturalist. 
Far from being necessary to universal religion, historical revelation is a for-
midable if not insurmountable obstacle to universality. Thus the only 
thing left in Kant's taxonomic scheme for him to be is a pure rationalist. 
But if he falls into this category, he not only does not deny the possibility of 
revelation he affirms its actuality. 
But classifying Kant as a pure rationalist by default is problematic. 
Clearly it is possible to hold that accepting revelation is not necessary for 
religion and neither to deny the reality of revelation, as the naturalist does, 
nor to affirm its reality, as the pure rationalist does. In other words, there 
is logical space in Kant's taxonomy for another category. Since he does not 
give it a name, I propose to call those who fall into it agnostic rationalists. 
We can then raise this question: Why should we classify Kant as a pure 
rationalist rather than as an agnostic rationalist? 
The answer, I think, begins to emerge when we note that Kant classifies 
religion not only with respect to first origin and inner possibility, as noted 
above, but also with respect to its capacity for being widely shared with 
others. In terms of the latter classification, we have "either the Ilatural reli-
gion, of which (once it has arisen) everyone can be convinced through his 
own reason, or a learned religion, of which one can convince others only 
through the agency of learning (in and through which they must be guid-
ed)" (p. 143). According to this classification, the pure religion of reason is 
natural. Moreover, it seems possible for there to be a religion that is both 
natural, because everyone can be convinced of it through reason, and 
revealed in terms of its origin, because its revelation contains nothing 
incompatible with what reason is capable of discovering. Noting this possi-
bility, Kant says that "such a religion, accordingly, can be natural, and at the 
same time revealed, when it is so constituted that men could and ought to have 
discovered it of themselves merely through the use of their reason, although 
they would not have come upon it so early, or over so wide an area, as is 
required" (pp. 143-144). I consider it characteristic of Enlightenment 
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thought to take this possibility seriously. Kant seems almost to be echoing 
Lessing, who had earlier said that "revelation gives nothing to the human 
race which human reason could not arrive at on its own; only it has given, 
and still gives to it, the most important of these things first."7 I suggest that 
Kant takes Christianity, properly interpreted, to be a religion that is both 
natural and revealed and accepts it thus understood. He therefore recog-
nizes its revelation and is indeed a pure rationalist.s 
Support for my suggestion can be found in Kant's explicit discussions of 
Christianity. He first discusses the Christian religion as a natural religion. 
After summarizing some of the moral doctrines expounded by the figure 
he describes as the Teacher, Kant delivers the following somewhat convo-
luted but nevertheless highly favorable verdict: "Here then is a complete 
religion, which can be presented to all men comprehensibly and convinc-
ingly through their own reason; while the possibility and even the necessi-
ty of its being an archetype for us to imitate (so far as men are capable of 
that imitation) have, be it noted, been made evident by means of an exam-
ple without either the truth of those teachings nor the authority and worth 
of the Teacher requiring any external certification (for which scholarship or 
miracles, which are not matters for everyone, would be required)" (p. 150). 
Kant also discusses the Christian religion as a learned religion. If 
Christianity as a learned religion is not to conflict with the natural religion 
within it, Kant maintains, "recognition and respect must be accorded, in 
Christian dogmatic, to universal human reason as the supremely com-
manding principle in a natural religion, and the revealed doctrine, upon 
which a church is founded and which stands in need of the learned as 
interpreters and conservers, must be cherished and cultivated as merely a 
means, but a most precious means, of making this doctrine comprehensi-
ble, even to the ignorant, as well as widely diffused and permanent" (pp. 
152-153). It is not obvious which doctrine Kant has in mind when he refers 
to the project of making a certain doctrine comprehensible, widely diffused 
and permanent. However, it makes little sense to suppose that the 
revealed doctrine is to be cherished as a mere means to making itself com-
prehensible. So I believe we should understand Kant's thought to be that 
the revealed doctrine is to be cherished and cultivated as a mere means to 
making the doctrine of natural religion within Christianity comprehensi-
ble, widely diffused and permanent.9 
What is the relation, by Kant's lights, between actual Christian churches, 
founded on the revealed doctrines of Christianity, and his ideal of a true 
church? Clearly no actual Christian church has yet become the true visible 
church. But has any of them become a true church in some other sense? 
Kant's criterion for addressing this question is the following: "When, there-
fore, (in conformity with the unavoidable limitation of human reason) an 
historical faith attaches itself to pure religion, as its vehicle, but with the 
consciousness that it is only a vehicle, and when this faith, having become 
ecclesiastical, embraces the principle of a continual approach to pure reli-
gious faith, in order finally to be able to dispense with the historical vehi-
cle, a church thus characterized can at any time be called the true church; 
but, since conflict over historical dogmas can never be avoided, it can be 
spoken of only as the church militant, though with the prospect of becom-
520 Faith and Philosophy 
ing finally the changeless and all-unifying church tri1lmphant" (p. 106). I 
dare sav no actual Christian church in Kant's dav had either become con-
scious ~f the historical or revealed portion of its doctrine as a mere vehicle 
or embraced the principle of approaching a purely moral religion in order 
to be able to dispense with that historical vehicle. I also think no actual 
Christian church in our day has done either of these things. Judged by 
Kant's standard, no actual Christian church has yet become the true 
church, not even the true church militant. By his lights, then, the reforma-
tion of Christianity, bravely begun by Luther and Calvin, still has a long 
way to gO.1O 
ll. Two implications of Kallt's Ecclesiology 
Kant's ecclesiology influences his views on many topics that should be 
of interest to Christian philosophers. I shall discuss only two of these top-
ics: scriptural interpretation and religious tolerance. Both are of consider-
able intrinsic importance. However, I focus on Kant's views about them 
chiefly because his views on these topics provide a basis for my criticism of 
fundamental features of his ecclesiology. 
According to Kant, the pure religion of reason ought to serve as the 
interpreter of ecclesiastical faiths. If an ecclesiastical faith's revelation is to 
be united or harmonized with the pure religion of reason and not to sepa-
rate from it like water from oil, an interpretation of the revelation is 
required that agrees with the universal moral rules laid down by practical 
reason. When the revelation is contained in scripture, as Kant thinks it best 
that it should be, interpretation will consist of textual exegesis. He cau-
tions us that "frequently this interpretation may, in the light of the text (of 
the revelation), appear forced-it may often really be forced; and yet if the 
text can possibly support it, it must be preferred to a literal interpretation 
which either contains nothing at all [helpful] to morality or else actually 
works counter to moral incentives" (pp. 100-101). In The Conflict of tlze 
Faculties, Kant proposes a specific principle of scriptural exegesis. It says 
this: "If a scriptural text contains certain theoretical teachings which are pro-
claimed sacred but which transcend all rational concepts (even moral ones), 
it may be interpreted in the interests of practical reason; but if it contains 
statements that contradict practical reason, it must be interpreted in the 
interests of practical reason."l1 Examples Kant provides can be used to 
illustrate the two clauses of this principle at work. 
Consider first the topic of Christology. According to a high Christology, 
Christ possesses both a divine nature and a human nature, united in a sin-
gle person. Kant can find nothing in such a conception that serves the 
interests of practical reason. As he points out, if we think of Christ "as the 
Divinity 'dwelling incarnate' in a real man and working as a second nature 
in him, then we can draw nothing practical from this mystery: since we 
cannot require ourselves to rival a God, we cannot take him as an exam-
ple."!2 In addition, we must confront the puzzle of why, if such a union 
can be brought about in one case, God does not produce it in every human 
case, thereby making all of us essentially well-pleasing to God. But Kant 
does find something that serves the interests of practical reason in a 
KANT/AN PHILOSOPHICAL ECCLESTOLOCY 521 
Christology which interprets Christ as the personification of the idea of 
humanity in its complete moral perfection. Hence he considers it permissi-
ble for him to employ this idea in interpreting scriptural texts that, if taken 
more literally, seem to support a high Christology. In a famous passage, 
he offers such an interpretation of the first verses of the Prologue to John's 
Gospel. It goes as follows: 
Mankind (rational earthly existence in general) in its complete mornl 
perfection is that which alone can render a world the object of a divine 
decree and the end of creation. With such perfection as the prime 
condition, happiness is the direct consequence, according to the will 
of the Supreme Being. Man so conceived, alone pleasing to God, "is 
in Him through eternity"; the idea of him proceeds from God's very 
being; hence he is no created thing but His only-begotten Son, "the 
Word (the Fiat!) through \vhich all other things are, and without 
which nothing is in existence that is made" (since for him, that is, for 
rational existence in the world, so far as he may be regarded in the 
light of his moral destiny, all things were made) (p. 54). 
Nicholas Wolterstorff intriguingly likens the sketch of an interpretation in 
this passage to "Brendel's giving one of his pupils some suggestions for 
interpreting the Hl1mmerklavier."13 No doubt some Christian readers of the 
Prologue to John's Gospel will consider the interpretation Kant sketches 
arbitrary or capricious; others will view his suggestions as forced or 
strained. To the charge of arbitrariness, Kant could respond that his inter-
pretation is constrained by the interests of practical reason. Taking Christ 
to be a personification of the idea of humanity in its complete moral perfec-
tion provides us with a vivid paradigm to imitate in our moral striving. As 
we have seen, Kant would not be bothered by the objection that his inter-
pretation is forced. Even if it is, he would insist, provided the text can sup-
port it, if only barely so, it is permissible and, indeed, must be preferred to 
more literal rivals that do not serve the interests of practical reason. 
Consider next the narrative in Genesis 22 of the akcdah, the binding of 
Isaac. According to the story, God commands Abraham to sacrifice his 
beloved son, innocent Isaac, and Abraham consents to do so. If the stOry is 
taken to be literally true, Abraham actually is divinely commanded to "kill 
Isaac. For Kant, however, Abraham clearly has a moral duty not to kill 
Isaac derived from practical reason, and so Abraham must be represented 
as divinely commanded not to kill Isaac. Hence the story, taken literally, 
contradicts practical reason in the sense that together they yield the result 
that Abraham is divinely commanded to perform each member of a pair of 
contradictory actions. According to the second clause of his principle of 
scriptural exegesis, Kant must interpret Genesis 22 in the interests of practi-
cal reason. He does so by denying, in effect, that God ever told Abraham 
to sacrifice Isaac. As Kant sees it, "in some cases man can be sure that the 
voice he hears is not God's; for if the voice commands him to do something 
contrary to the moral law, then no matter how majestic the apparition may 
be, and no matter how it may seem to surpass the whole of nature, he must 
consider it an illusion."" And in a footnote Kant goes on to say that 
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"Abraham should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: 'That I 
ought not to kill my good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition, 
are God-of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice 
rings down to me from (visible) heaven.'''l' So Kant defends the interests 
of practical reason in the case of the story of the akedah by insisting that, if 
Abraham heard a voice commanding him to sacrifice Isaac that seemed to 
be God's, he could and should have been sure that it was instead the voice 
of an illusory apparition. He does not suggest that the story provides any 
positive service to those interests. But I suppose one might read it in a 
morally edifying way by holding that the point of having the angel in the 
story allow Abraham to sacrifice a ram rather than Isaac was to teach that 
God disapproves of human sacrifice. 
Since we are two centuries more removed than Kant was from the 
Wars of Religion, religious toleration is perhaps a less burning issue for 
us than it was for him. In the West, it is largely taken for granted now, 
except in peripheral trouble spots such as Beirut, Belfast and Bosnia. But 
for most of the common era respectable Christian opinion endorsed the 
use of the coercive power of the state to persecute religious dissent. 
From the time of Augustine onward, Luke 14:23 was often cited as justifi-
cation in revelation for such an endorsement. In that verse, which is con-
tained in the Parable of the Great Dinner, the master says to the slave, 
"Go out into the roads and lanes, and compel people to come in, so that 
my house may be filled." Advocates of religious toleration before Kant, 
for instance, Pierre Bayle in his Philosophical Commentary on the Words of 
the Gospel, "Compel them to come in," had grappled with this text. l6 Kant 
alludes to it in a brief treatment of toleration. 
Kant's discussion of toleration is set in the context of an exposition of his 
doctrine of conscience. He defines conscience as "a state of consciousness 
which in itself is duty" (p. 173). Opposing the probabilist principle that the 
opinion that an action may well be right is sufficient to justify performing 
it, he insists that I must be sure that any action I propose to perform is 
right. In other words, I have a duty to be conscious that any action I intend 
to perform is right. Kant illustrates how the duty of conscience works with 
the case of an inquisitor who is called upon to pass judgment on someone 
charged with heresy but otherwise a good citizen. Is it morally permissible 
for the inquisitor to condemn the accused person to death? In a sentence 
that alludes to the famous verse from Luke's Gospel, Kant asks us to sup-
pose that the inquisitor "was firm in the belief that a supernaturally 
revealed Divine Will (perhaps in accord with the saying, compel/ife intrare) 
permitted him, if it did not actually impose it as duty, to extirpate pre-
sumptive disbelief together with the disbelievers" (pp. 174-175). But does 
the inquisitor's belief, firm though we suppose it to be, have a high enough 
epistemic status that the inquisitor can in good conscience intend to act on 
it? In a familiar passage in which he alludes to the akedah, Kant returns a 
negative answer to this question. It goes as follows: 
That it is wrong to deprive a man of his life because of his religious 
faith is certain, unless (to allow for the most remote possibility) a 
Divine Will, made known in extraordinary fashion, has ordered it 
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otherwise. But that God has ever uttered this terrible injunction can 
be asserted only on the basis of historical documents and is never 
apodictically certain. After all, the revelation has reached the inquisi-
tor only through men and has been interpreted by men, and even did 
it appear to have come to him from God Himself (like the command 
delivered to Abraham to slaughter his own son like a sheep) it is at 
least possible that in this instance a mistake has prevailed. But if this 
is so, the inquisitor would risk the danger of doing what would be 
wrong in the highest degree; and in this very act he is behaving 
un conscientiously (p. 175). 
According to Kant, then, the inquisitor's situation is to be analyzed in epis-
temic terms along these lines. The duty not to kill people on account of 
their religious faith is part of the pure religion of reason and lies within the 
inner circle. The claim that it binds the inquisitor has a very high epistemic 
status. By contrast, the claim that killing heretics is morally permissible, or 
even required, belongs to the historical or revealed part of an ecclesiastical 
faith and lies in that portion of the outer circle not also contained within the 
inner circle. It has a lower epistemic status. And even if killing heretics 
were apparently directly commanded by God, the claim that killing heretics 
is not wrong would not acquire an epistemic status exceeding that of the 
claim that killing heretics is wrong. Hence the inquisitor can never be sure 
that killing a heretic is morally right. The inquisitor would therefore act 
unconscientiously and thereby violate a duty by condemning a heretic, who 
is otherwise a good citizen, to death. Kant generalizes from the example to 
other cases in which following an injunction rooted in the historical or 
revealed part of an ecclesiastical faith carries with it "the danger of disobe-
dience to a human duty which is certain in and of itself" (p. 175). And pre-
sumably the generalization is meant by Kant to cover not only extreme 
cases such killing heretics but also other uses of coercive measures by 
church or state to suppress dissent from a particular ecclesiastical faith. 
What is more, Kant extends the argument to acts allowable in them-
selves and taken by the revealed part of an ecclesiastical faith to be divinely 
commanded such as worshipping in public on a certain day of the week or 
professing firm belief in doctrines whose sole source is historical revela-
tion. He asks whether ecclesiastical authorities mayor should impose 
what they hold to be such positive revealed law on the laity as an article of 
faith they must subscribe to on pain of forfeiting their status in their empir-
ical church. The fault he finds with such an imposition is that "the clergy-
man would be requiring the people at least inwardly to confess something 
to be as true as is their belief in God, i. e., to confess, as though in the pres-
ence of God, something which they do not know with certainty" (p. 175). 
In doing this the clergyman would, Kant thinks, be acting in an unconsci-
entious manner. He "would himself go counter to conscience in forcing 
others to believe that of which he himself can never be wholly convinced; 
he should therefore in justice consider well what he does, for he must 
answer for all abuse arising out of such a compulsory faith" (p. 176). If we 
take Kant's reference to being wholly convinced to concern complete psy-
chological conviction, we will probably think he underestimates the extent 
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to which the clergy can acquire convictions whose psychological certitude 
outstrips their epistemic certainty. So we would probably do better to 
attribute to him the thought that it is unconscientious and so contrary to 
duty to force others to believe anything one cannot be, and so is not, epis-
temically certain of oneself. On this interpretation, the duty of conscien-
tiousness supports, as Kant sees it, not only mutual toleration among 
diverse ecclesiastical faiths but also free faith, that is, faith freely assented 
to by all, within each of them. 
IT!. Kant's Ecc/esiology Criticized and Revised 
Christians may well wish to quarrel with Kant's ecclesiology on numer-
ous points of detail. It might be argued, for example, that the text of the 
Prologue to John's Gospel cannot support the interpretation of it Kant 
sketches. Or, it might be claimed that Kant's understanding of the case of 
the inquisitor and of the akedah is incorrect. He allows, after all, for the 
remote possibility that the inquisitor has been ordered by God to kill 
heretics by means of a divine command made known in extraordinary 
fashion. And clearly it is within God's power, though it would indeed be 
extraordinary, to provide evidence that would make the claim that such a 
command had been given maximally certain. To be sure, as Kant notes, 
even if God did this and the inquisitor took the command to have come 
from God, it would remain possible that a mistake had prevailed. 
However, one might disagree with the Kantian view according to which it 
is maximally certain that it is always wrong to deprive someone of life for 
heresy. It is also possible that there are exceptions to this moral principle. 
So it seems at least possible for it to be more certain that God has com-
manded an inquisitor to kill a heretic than that it is wrong for the inquisitor 
to do so. Similarly, it seems at least possible for it to be more certain that 
Abraham has been commanded by God to sacrifice Isaac than that it is 
wrong for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. Hence it seems at least possible for 
there to be a conscientious inquisitor who condemns a heretic to death and 
an Abraham who conscientiously consents to sacrifice Isaac. 
But, for present purposes, I think it would not be useful to linger too 
long over points of detail. I propose instead to proceed directly to what I 
take to be the deepest objection to Kant's ecclesiology, which is a challenge 
to its basic structure. The objection is that practical reason is just not up to 
the task Kant assigns it in his ecclesiology. In order to present the objec-
tion, let me draw attention to a feature of Kant's image of the concentric 
circles I have heretofore not mentioned. Kant needs the circumference of 
the inner circle to mark two distinct boundaries. On the one hand, within 
it lies the pure religion of reason, which consists of Kantian morality and 
its postulated God, while outside it lie other historical and revealed doc-
trines of ecclesiastical faiths. On the other hand, within it lie propositions 
with some very high epistemic status such as being certain in and of them-
selves while outside are to be found only propositions with one or another 
lower epistemic status. Kant supposes that these two distinctions, one 
based on kinds of doctrine and the other epistemologically based, coincide 
in extension and so determine a single boundary. As I see it, this supposi-
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tion is the ground of his confidence that the pure religion of reason ought 
to serve as the interpreter of ecclesiastical faiths and that, when conflict 
arises, scripture must be interpreted in the interests of practical reason. It is 
also what lies behind his view that the moral deliverances of practical rea-
son are fit to serve as an Archimedean fixed point from which ecclesiastical 
faiths, relegated to role of mere vehicles, can be subjected to critique, purifi-
cation, reformation and perhaps even elimination. Yet there are, in my 
opinion, two good reasons for us to doubt Kant's powerful supposition. 
One stems from the historical fate of Kant's own moral theory. In the 
course of the more than two centuries during which it has been debated, it 
has not become the focus of a consensus on the part of all reasonable moral 
inquirers who have considered it. Many reasonable people reject the con-
clusions Kant draws about the famous four examples of the Groundwork. 
Of course there are strategies for salvaging parts of Kantian moral theory. 
It can be argued, for instance, that Kant himself misunderstood his own 
theory in some respects and thus made mistakes in applying it to one or 
more of the four examples. The predictable result of such salvage opera-
tions, however, seems to me to be the plurality of reasonable views found 
on the contemporary philosophical scene that are more or less Kantian in 
spirit. And other modern moral theories have suffered similar fates. I 
think Robert M. Adams has made the correct pessimistic induction. He 
says: "Nothing in the history of modern secular ethical theory gives reason 
to expect that general agreement on a single comprehensive ethical theory 
will ever be achieved-or that, if achieved, it would long endure in a cli-
mate of free inquiry."" Like rock and roll, reasonable pluralism in moral 
theory is here to stay. From the fact of reasonable pluralism in moral theo-
ry, I draw the conclusion that it is utopian to hope that, under conditions of 
free inquiry, any moral theory will, in its entirety, ever acquire the high 
epistemic status for all of us needed to fit it for the role Kant wanted his 
moral theory to play in the universally shared pure religion of reason. 
A second reason for skepticism about Kant's powerful supposition can 
be generated from the method of reflective equilibrium that has received a 
good deal of attention in recent discussion of the methodology of moral 
theorizing.ls According to that method, roughly described, one is to seek 
coherence in one's views, starting from one's considered judgments, by 
proceeding first to a narrow equilibrium in ethics between judgments 
about principles and judgments about particular cases and then to a wide 
equilibrium between ethical judgments and judgments about other matters 
such as the nature of human persons. In the course of employing the pro-
cedure, when cont1icts in judgment come up and must be resolved in the 
interest of achieving coherence, one is to stick with the judgment that 
seems to one more likely to be correct and reject or revise the other judg-
ment. If the procedure is successful, its output will be a large and coherent 
body of judgments, some ethical and some not. Suppose that one belief 
seeming more likely than another to be correct is both a contributor to and 
an indicator of the former having a higher epistemic status than the latter. 
Consider people who have religious beliefs and treat them as inputs to the 
process of seeking wide reflective equilibrium. Is it likely that at wide 
reflective equilibrium their beliefs will be structured in a way that is aptly 
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represented by Kant's concentric circles? I think not. 
Think first about what is likely to happen when the people under con-
sideration proceed to narrow reflective equilibrium. Their method does 
not guarantee convergence in judgment. I imagine it is possible that they 
converge on a single set of moral judgments that coincides everywhere 
with Kant's morality. But if they are even moderately diverse in cultural 
background and personal experience, then, though some overlap in moral 
judgment at narrow reflective equilibrium would not be surprising, it is 
highly unlikely that there will be complete agreement on Kant's morality. 
Think next about the move from narrow reflective equilibrium of moral 
beliefs to wide reflective equilibrium of moral beliefs with theological 
beliefs from historical sources or revelation. Again, I imagine it is possible 
that, whenever conflict between moral beliefs and theological beliefs arises, 
all the people being considered always resolve it by sticking with the moral 
beliefs and revising or reinterpreting the theological beliefs. But this too is 
vastly unlikely. It is much more likely that many of them will sometimes 
resolve conflict in favor of moral beliefs and sometimes in favor of theolog-
ical beliefs. Finally, think about the people in question after they have 
reached theo-ethical coherence at wide reflective equilibrium; consider 
what would be the result of trying to isolate for each of them an inner ker-
nel of beliefs with maximal certainty or some comparable high epistemic 
status by drawing a circle around exactly those beliefs. Would this inner 
core consist in all cases of Kant's pure religion of reason? I grant that this is 
possible, but, once more, I consider it extremely unlikely. It is very likely 
that there would be no universally shared inner core at all. It is also very 
likely that for many of the people under consideration the inner core, if 
there were one, would contain a mixture of moral and theological beliefs 
rather than consisting entirely of belief in Kant's morality and its deity. 
I believe the method of wide reflective equilibrium is a useful method in 
ethics. In the present context, however, it serves for me mainly as a device 
for representing what is likely to happen in conditions of moderate cultural 
and experiential diversity under the free play of human reason. My con-
clusion is that reason is unlikely to yield a comprehensive moral doctrine 
capable of functioning as Kant expects his morality operate. It is highly 
improbable that reason will carve out for all who employ it conscientiously 
anything like Kant's pure religion of reason that can both be universally 
shared and serve as a fixed point in a critique of the revelations of various 
ecclesiastical faiths. From an epistemological point of view, Kant's ecclesi-
ology is therefore excessively ambitious. 
But it is important not to throw the baby out with the bath water. If we 
look at things less systematically and more on a piecemeal basis, T dare say 
most of us will discover cases in which we have moral convictions we right-
ly consider more likely to be correct than competing convictions whose 
source is the historical part of an ecclesiastical faith. So I see promise in a 
chastened Kantianism that proceeds on a case by case basis to deploy moral 
beliefs of high epistemic stahlS as levers, as it were, to move churches and 
their members in the direction of reforming ecclesiastical arrangements and 
reinterpreting scriptures. It may be that such a critical stance toward eccle-
siastical faiths is only feasible in a culture in which there are accessible 
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moral sources independent of ecclesiastical faith. If so, chastened Kantian 
ecclesiology will be as much a product of modernity as Kant's own more 
ambitious systematic project of ecclesiological critique was. 
Something like a chastened Kantianism seems to be at work in a recent 
discussion of the akedah by Robert M. Adams. In his Finite and Infinite 
Goods, there is a chapter devoted to Abraham's dilemma, though the 
Abraham of whom Adams speaks is not exactly the Abraham of the 
Hebrew Bible. Adams operates with a methodology that allows for ethical 
sources independent of theology to exert critical leverage on theological 
ethics; he tells us that "we simply will not and should not accept a theolog-
ical ethics that ascribes to God a set of commands that is too much at vari-
ance with the ethical outlook that we bring to our theological thinking."''! 
He cites the passage from The Conflict of the Facuities, quoted above, in 
which Kant provides Abraham with a reply to the supposedly divine 
voice, and he goes on to say that it is not easy to reject Kant's verdict on the 
case. Like Kant, Adams concentrates on the epistemological aspects of the 
situation. He comes down on Kant's side of the epistemological issue. 
Reflecting on the possibility of divinely commanded but otherwise unnec-
essary human sacrifices, he observes that "a situation in which I would 
find it reasonable to believe that a good God had given such an abhorrent 
command seems to me so unimaginable, however, that I think it is at best a 
waste of spiritual energy to try to decide what one should do in that 
case."20 And in the same vein, he concludes the chapter with the remark 
that "the question whether God commands such a thing should stay off 
our epistemological agenda as long as it possibly can, which I expect will 
be forever."2l Yet Adams does not rule out altogether the possibility that 
he might believe a divine command to sacrifice an innocent person had 
been issued. He considers the story, told in Shalom Spiegel's The Last Trial, 
of a Rabbi Samuel and his son Yehiel, also a rabbi, who were confronted 
with the alternatives of death and forced conversion to Christianity.22 In 
the story, Yehiel offers himself to be sacrificed, and Samuel kills him. 
Commenting on it, Adams states that "if they claimed that God told them 
to do what they did, I would not say that no such command could come 
from God."23 It is in the spirit of the chastened Kantianism I find promising 
to conduct discussion of the issue of divinely commanded human sacrifice 
on a case by case basis, as Adams does. It is also consonant with its spirit 
to expect some reasonable disagreement between him and others about 
either the case of Abraham and Isaac or the case of Samuel and Yehiel or 
about both cases. 
But what, if anything, does Kantian ecclesiology, chastened or not, have 
to do with actual Christian churches and the ecclesiologies their theolo-
gians provide for them? In conclusion, I address this question with refer-
ence to the Roman Catholic ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council. 
IV. Chastened Kantian Ecdesiology and Roman Catholic Ecdesiology 
No doubt there are contemporary religious movements that have gone a 
long way toward the Kantian ideal of a largely moral core embedded in an 
historical vehicle that minimizes commitment to revealed doctrine. Subject 
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to correction by those who view them from the inside, I would say that 
Unitarian Universalism is one example rooted in Christianity and Reform 
Judaism is another. But the idea that the ecclesiology of the Roman 
Catholic Church has moved in a Kantian direction may initially seem quite 
surprising. I propose to explore this idea briefly with reference to the 
ecclesiology of Vatican II, basing my discussion on the summary of that 
ecclesiology found in Richard P. McBrien's magisterial Catholicism. It 
would, of course, not be plausible to claim that Kant directly influenced the 
ecclesiology of Vatican II. A standard history of the Catholic Church, writ-
ten by the theologian McBrien praises as the most important ecclesiologist 
of the twentieth century, does not even mention Kant in its brief treatment 
of the Aufkliirung.24 However, I think it is plausible to view Kant as having 
articulated in a particularly forceful and radical way thoughts that have 
become increasingly influential in recent Catholic ecclesiology. 
McBrien sums up the ecc1esiology of Vatican II in ten points and spells 
out how each of them represents a change in Catholic thought. After 
reporting what he says, I shall in each case add my own comparisons with 
Kantian ecclesiology. 
First, the church is, first and foremost, a mystery or sacrament. 
According to McBrien, this principle "supplants the pre-Vatican II empha-
sis on the Church as a means of salvation."25 In Kant's ecclesiology, mystery 
and sacrament lie outside the inner circle that circumscribes the pure reli-
gion of reason and belong to the part of ecclesiastical faith that is not 
included in this religion. Yet the philosopher has no reason to deny them 
provided they do not conflict with morality. They must, however, be 
regarded as means, not of salvation but of strengthening human efforts to 
create an ethical commonwealth. In my chastened Kantian ecclesiology, it 
is not impossible in principle for claims about sacramentality to achieve 
high epistemic status at wide reflective equilibrium. But there remains a 
large gap between Kant's vision of the core of the church as nothing but a 
moral community and the view of Vatican II that it is a mystery. 
Second, the church is the whole people of God. McBrien takes this prin-
ciple to have "replaced the pre-Vatican II emphasis on the Church as hier-
archical institution, which tended to make the study of the Church more 
akin to 'hierarchology' than to 'eccesiology'" (p. 684). This principle is con-
sonant with Kant's ecclesiology in two ways. The ethical commonwealth, 
which is the te/os of empirical churches, is to be represented as a people of 
God, potentially universal in scope, under laws of virtue. And the princi-
ple's opposition to hierarchy matches Kant's insistence that the true visible 
church will be neither a monarchy nor an aristocracy. The chastened 
Kantian ecc1esiology I favor can endorse these two points of agreement 
between Kant and Vatican II. 
Third, the whole people of God-laity, religious, and clergy alike-is 
called to participate in the mission of Christ as Prophet, Priest and King. 
McBrien thinks this principle "replaces the pre-Vatican II notion of 'Catholic 
Action,' wherein the laity participates only in the mission of the hierarchy" 
(p.684). To the extent that the thrust of this principle is against hierarchy it 
is harmonious with Kant's ecclesiology. However, there is tension between 
its conception of the mission of Christ and Kant's christology. For Kant, 
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Christ functions as the exemplar of humanity in its complete moral perfec-
tion and as the Teacher of the morality of the Gospels. Within the limits of 
reason, Christ serves only moral purposes, though reason is not in a posi-
tion to deny flatly other christological mysteries. Kant could, I think, find 
no moral use for Christ as a king. He could allow there to be a role for 
Christ as a prophet if we think of prophets chiefly as preachers of moral 
reform. And he could even make room for a priestly function for Christ 
provided it placed the emphasis on his work as what Kant describes as a 
divine, that is, a teacher of moral religion, rather than as what Kant thinks of 
as a priest, a steward of pious rites. So there is partial overlap rather than 
complete coincidence between this principle of Vatican II and Kant's ecclesi-
ology. My more latitudianarian chastened Kantianism leaves open the pos-
sibility of greater overlap with the principle at wide reflective equilibrium. 
Fourth, the mission of the people of God includes service to human 
needs in the social, political and economic orders as well as the preaching 
of the Word and the celebration of the sacraments. McBrien argues that 
this principle "supplants the pre-Vatican II notion of 'pre-evangelization,' 
wherein such service is, or may be, a necessary preparation for the preach-
ing of the Gospel (evangelization) but is not itself essential to the Church's 
mission in the same way as the preaching or the celebration of the sacra-
ments" (p. 684). By promoting service to human needs from the status of a 
means to evangelization to that of a central part of the mission in its own 
right, this principle takes a step in the direction of the Kantian view that 
morality must be at the core of any church with prospects for becoming a 
true church. Kant's own ecclesiology, however, would assign sacramental-
ity to the part of ecclesiastical faith that belongs to the shell rather than the 
kernel of pure moral religion. As previously noted, a chastened Kantian 
ecclesiology does not guarantee that graduations in epistemic status will 
enforce an invidious distinction of this sort. 
Fifth, the church is realized and expressed at the local as well as the uni-
versallevel; it is a communion of churches. McBrien's view is that this prin-
ciple "supplants the common pre-Vatican II notion that the Church is, for all 
practical purposes, always understood as the Church universal, centralized 
in the Vatican under the supreme authority of the pope, with each diocese 
considered only as an administrative division of the Church universal, and 
each parish, in turn, an administrative subdivision of the diocese" (p. 685). 
Kant's ecclesiology does not go into detail about how to set up the adminis-
tration of a large empirical church. But it does not aspire to the kind of uni-
versality that depends on securing agreement by submission to a central-
ized authority. Instead it looks for spontaneous agreement in morality that 
derives from the self-legislation of practical reason in each of us. So Kant's 
ecclesiology is consistent with the full realization of the moral core of the 
pure religion of reason in local churches. Chastened Kantianism's more 
modest expectation is that there will be a reasonable pluralism of moral 
views both within and among local churches; it also supports the conclu-
sion that a central authority's attempts to impose agreement in moral belief 
are unlikely to succeed under conditions of free inquiry. 
Sixth, the church embraces more than the Roman Catholic Church; it is 
the whole Body of Christ: Catholics, Orthodox, Anglicans and Protestants 
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alike. McBrien holds that this principle "sets aside the pre-Vatican II con-
cept that the Roman Catholic Church alone is the one, true Church, and 
that the other Christian communities (never called 'churches' before 
Vatican II) are somehow 'related' to the Church but are not real members 
of it" (p. 685). Like this principle, Kant's view rejects Roman Catholic 
ecclesiological exclusivism. By Kant's lights, however, no actual Christian 
church is, as we have seen, the true church, not even the true church mili-
tant. Yet, like this principle, his ecclesiology does allow that true religion 
can be found in various Christian churches despite the diversity of their 
modes of belief. A chastened Kantian ecclesiology will, of course, also 
allow that various Christian churches can achieve epistemic parity. 
Lacking Kant's pure religion of reason in its unadorned form to serve as a 
telos for ecclesiastical development, chastened Kantianism cannot appeal to 
it as a benchmark by which to judge that any actual Christian church falls 
short of being a true church. 
Seventh, the mission of the whole church is (a) one of proclamation of the 
Gospel that is always subordinate to the Word of God; (b) one of celebration 
of the sacraments in a way that engages the intelligent participation of wor-
shippers; (c) one of witnessing to the Gospel through a life-style that is 
marked by humility, compassion, respect for human rights, etc.; and (d) one 
of service to those in need, both inside and outside the Church. McBrien 
believes this principle "expands upon a narrower view of mission in pre-
Vatican II ecclesiology, namely, one that tended to restrict the mission to the 
preaching of the Word and the celebration of the sacraments, and one 
which perhaps paid too little attention to the missionary responsibility of 
corporate witnessing to the Gospel" (pp. 685-686). To the extent that this 
expansion's third and fourth points stress the importance of morality by 
adding weight to the tasks of witnessing through virtuous living and serv-
ing those in need, they represent movement in the direction of Kant's eccle-
siology and are compatible with chastened Kantianism. But, as we saw in 
the discussion above of the fourth principle, the second point's emphasis on 
sacramentality gives it role somewhat at odds with Kant's view that sacra-
mentality is to be relegated to the empirical vehicle from which pure moral 
religion should strive to free itself. And if the ranking referred to in the first 
point involves subordinating the morality of the Gospels to revealed doc-
trine, Kant would surely insist that the proper order of subordination is the 
reverse. A chastened Kantianism will not necessarily be in tension with the 
ecclesiology of Vatican II on these two points. 
Eighth, all authority in the church is to be exercised as a service and in a 
collegial mode. McBrien maintains that this principle "is intended to trans-
form the exercise of authority from one of domination and unilateral deci-
sion-making, as prevailed in the pre-Vatican II period" (p. 686). Since Kant 
says repeatedly that the ministers of a church should be servants of its 
invisible head and not high officials who exercise domination over its 
members, he would undoubtedly approve of the intention to work such a 
transformation in the exercise of ecclesiastical authority. Chastened 
Kantianism too permits and can endorse change along these lines. 
Ninth, religious truth is to be found outside the Body of Christ and 
should be respected wherever it is found; in no case is anyone to be 
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coerced to embrace Christianity or Catholicism. In McBrien's opinion, this 
principle "replaces a too-exclusive understanding of revelation as 
'Christian revelation,' as well as the formula 'Error has no rights'" (p. 686). 
By means of this princple, Vatican II joins Kant in supporting religious 
freedom and religious toleration, and these values have become sufficient-
ly robust under democratic regimes that most chastened Kantians who 
have the good fortune to live under such regimes would also support them 
at wide reflective equilibrium. And both Kant's ecclesiology and its chas-
tened kin lack the resources to establish the claim that revelation cannot 
occur outside of Christianity. 
Tenth, the nature and mission of the church are to be understood in rela-
tionship and in subordination to the Kingdom of God. McBrien supposes 
that this principle "replaces what was perhaps the most serious pre-
Vatican II ecclesiological misunderstanding, namely, that the Church is 
identical with the Kingdom of God" (p. 686). If this were so, he adds, the 
church would be beyond all need for institutional reform. No doubt there 
are eschatological differences between Kant and Vatican II. Kant thinks 
that the gradual transition from ecclesiastical faith to the exclusive sover-
eignty of pure moral faith is the coming of the Kingdom of God. He tells 
us: "We have good reason to say, however, that 'the Kingdom of God is 
come unto us' once the principle of the gradual transition of ecclesiastical 
faith to the universal religion of reason, and so to a (divine) ethical state on 
earth, has become general and has also gained somewhere a public 
foothold, even though the actual establishment of this state is still infinitely 
removed from us" (p. 113). But even when the Kingdom has come in prin-
ciple, there will remain, before it is established, an interval of time that may 
never end or may end only in a divinely produced consummation. 
Throughout that interval, critique and reform of ecclesiastical institutions 
will continue to be needed. Though the picture Vatican II presents of what 
the Kingdom of God will look like when it is fully realized may differ sub-
stantially from Kant's vision, the gap between the church of the present 
and the foreseeable future and the Kingdom of the eschaton leaves similar 
space for institutional critique and reform. It is likely that a gap of this 
kind will also exist at wide reflective equilibrium in chastened Kantianism. 
In order to paint a balanced and comprehensive picture of both conver-
gences and divergences of the ecclesiologies of Kant and Vatican II, I have 
covered all ten of the points under which McBrien organizes his treatment 
of the ecclesiology of Vatican II. It is obvious that my discussion of that 
ecclesiology does not delve deeply into it and is far from exhaustive. It 
does, however, allow us to discern a pattern. By comparison with pre-
Vatican II Catholic views, the ecclesiology of Vatican II represents move-
ment in a Kantian direction on several moral and political issues. They 
include opposition to hierarchical domination in the church, recognition of 
the centrality in the church's mission of moral service to those in need, 
acceptance of reasonable ecclesiastical pluralism within Christianity, sup-
port for religious freedom and religious toleration and, most important of 
all, acknowledgement of the continuing legitimacy of institutional critique 
and reform. But sources of tension remain, the most salient of which is the 
emphasis in the ecclesiology of Vatican II on sacramentality as a crucial 
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part of the definition of the church and its mission. For Kant, a doctrine of 
sacra mentality would belong to the part of ecclesiastical faith that is not 
also a part of the pure religion of reason. Though he would allow that rea-
son is not competent to deny such a doctrine provided it does not conflict 
with morality, he would locate it, along with other historical or revealed 
doctrines, in the vehicle of moral religion, which can be dispensed with in 
principle, and deny it the importance it has in the ecclesiology of Vatican II. 
T have argued that a chastened Kantianism, which is more realistic about 
the limits of reason as we have come to understand them since the time of 
Kant, would serve to reduce if not eliminate tension of this kind. 
In ecclesiology, Kant may properly be conceived, in my opinion, as con-
tinuing and radicalizing the tradition of the Reformation. 26 Its slogan, 
'Always Reforming: signals a recognition that, all things human being sus-
ceptible to corruption, the work of reformation is never done. By analogi-
cal extension, we may think of idolatry of a certain sort as the danger 
against which ongoing reform is to help safeguard us. According to 
Robert M. Adams, this sort of idolatry "happens when one fails to distin-
guish devotion to God or the good from devotion to one's own religion or 
one's own idea of God or the good."27 One's church too can become an idol 
in this sense. The ecclesiology of Vatican II insists that the Catholic Church 
is not identical with the Kingdom of God; in so doing it opens a possibility 
for ecclesiastical reform that counteracts the human tendency toward this 
form of idolatry. In a more radical way, Kant had earlier made room for a 
similar possibility by distinguishing between the empirical churches of the 
ecclesiastical faiths and the true church of pure moral faith, which has not 
yet been realized on earth and may never be fully realized unless God 
intervenes. I think a less radical chastened Kantianism should not lose 
sight of this possibility. Its ecclesiology should share with those of Kant 
and Vatican II openness, stretching indefinitely into the future, to critique 
and reform of ecclesiastical institutions. This is an important lesson 
Christian philosophers can and should discover in Kantian philosophical 
ecclesiology.28 
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